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Abstract 
Airborne separation assurance is seen as a promising 
option for the future air traffic management concept 
to provide an increase in capacity and flight 
efficiency while maintaining flight safety. Sofar, 
studies or expectations are largely based on 
assumptions about the achievable spacing and 
separation criteria. These assumptions range from 
optimistic to reserved, when comparing these 
separation criteria to currently used radar 
surveillance-based values. In any case, there is a clear 
knowledge gap on this subject. Thus, it is important 
to assess the relationship between spacing and 
separation distances on one hand and safety on the 
other hand. This relationship directly affects the 
effectiveness of airborne separation assurance.  
The aim of this paper is to address this issue by 
conducting an accident risk assessment, including a 
bias and uncertainty assessment and an assessment of 
risk sensitivity to spacing and separation values. Each 
stage in the methodology used is illustrated by 
examples. It is shown that the methodology provides 
valuable feedback on both the airborne separation 
assurance operation and the accident risk assessment.  
1. Introduction 
This paper estimates a difficult metric, namely 
the risk of the rare event of collision between two 
aircraft under a concept of operation that does not yet 
exist in any aviation system worldwide but has been 
proposed as a viable alternative for the future. 
Rare event estimation has been widely studied 
for various safety-critical operations, such as the 
nuclear and chemical industries, air traffic and many 
other. Rare event estimation approaches can be 
subdivided into two groups: approaches based on 
statistical analysis of collected data and those that are 
based on the modelling of the processes leading to 
the accident. The statistical analysis of extreme 
values needs a long observation time given the very 
low probability of the events considered, [1]. The 
modelling approach consists of formulating the 
operation considered and secondly by using Petri net 
modelling, analysis and simulation in obtaining rare 
event estimates, [2], [3].  
The approach used in this paper is a good 
example of the latter approach to estimate such a 
difficult metric of collision risk between aircraft and 
yet retrieve practical results. The salient feature of 
modelling this risk is that multiple non-nominal 
events must occur for such a collision to happen. As 
such, modelling these events is critical, and this paper 
exploits the use of Petri Nets and state-based Monte 
Carlo simulation as a good technique for this type of 
analysis. 
2. Concept operation to be modelled 
By exploiting advances in flight deck 
technologies, such as ADS-B (Airborne Dependent 
Surveillance - Broadcast), and air-to-air data link, 
airborne separation assurance is seen as a promising 
option for the future Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
concept, to provide an increase in capacity and flight 
efficiency while maintaining flight safety. In this 
concept, pilots are allowed to select their trajectory 
freely at real time, at the cost of acquiring 
responsibility for conflict prevention [4], [5]. It 
changes ATM in such a fundamental way, that one 
could speak of a paradigm shift: the centralised 
control becomes a distributed one, responsibilities 
transfer from ground to air, air traffic control 
sectorisation and routes are removed and new 
technologies are brought in. It also plays an important 
role in the distributed air-ground traffic management 
concept, which allows for distributed decision-
making between flight deck, air traffic service 
providers and aeronautical operational control centres 
of airlines, for further optimisation of operations. 
The advantage of airborne separation assurance 
is that it may eliminate the situation that acceptable 
ground controller workload puts a limit on air traffic 
capacity. Hence, an alternative operational concept 
worth investigating is one in which there is no 
tactical air traffic controller; all separation assurance 
tasks lie with the pilots. The general expectation is 
that with such a concept, air traffic capacity may 
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improve significantly, even if spacing and separation 
criteria would stay the same. At the same time, it is 
generally accepted that a particular airborne 
separation assurance based operational concept will 
have its own capacity/safety limitations. Hence, many 
studies or expectations are based on particular 
hypotheses about the achievable spacing or 
separation criteria. Optimistic views are that they 
could be much smaller than radar separation; other 
views are much more reserved and warn that 
minimum separation distances might be much larger. 
In any case, there is a clear knowledge gap on this 
subject. Thus, it is important to assess the 
relationships of spacing between flight plans, 
separation between airpaths, and collision risk, as 
they directly affect the effectiveness of an airborne 
separation assurance application, [6]. 
Since collisions occur very infrequently, even 
for current ATM procedures there is not sufficient 
statistical data to verify evaluated collision risk 
results in a direct way against operational data. For 
new operations, such as autonomous (i.e. free flight) 
aircraft operations, there even is far less operational 
data available. Therefore, one has to rely on model-
based risk assessment to gain insight into this 
complex matter. It can help to learn where unsafety 
comes from, how it is influenced, which factors have 
the highest impact, and what contribution is coming 
from separation distances.  
3. Approach taken 
In 1998, by a joint effort of Eurocontrol and 
FAA, in collaboration with some key developers of 
aviation risk assessment tools, an overview was 
produced [7] that outlines the relevant approaches in 
development and/or in use for the safe separation 
assessment of advanced procedures in air traffic. Five 
collision risk directed approaches, i.e. ABRM 
(Analytic Blunder Risk Model) [8], ASAT (Airspace 
Simulation and Analysis for Terminal instrument 
procedures), the Collision Risk Model (CRM) of 
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) [9], 
RASRAM (Reduced Aircraft Separation Risk 
Assessment Model) [10], and TOPAZ (Traffic 
Organisation and Perturbation AnalyZer) [11] were 
identified and reviewed. The TOPAZ methodology 
appeared to be most advanced in adopting a 
simulation model-based risk assessment and in going 
beyond established approaches. Since then, TOPAZ 
has been further extended, e.g. by a bias and 
uncertainty assessment method [12].  
In this paper, we present the results obtained by 
a TOPAZ based accident risk assessment for a 
hypothetical situation in which aircraft equipped for 
free flight are assumed to maintain separation without 
direct involvement of Air Traffic Control (ATC). For 
the accident risk assessment, we consider the flow of 
traffic between two major airports only, say A and B, 
and assume that the aircraft fly on a direct route 
between these two airports, separated on two parallel 
opposite direction lanes at the same flight level, see 
Figure 1. In this figure, S' denotes lateral separation 
minimum and S denotes lateral spacing between the 
parallel opposite direction lanes. If the spacing S is 
taken to be equal to or smaller than the separation 
minimum S', it would be quite likely that two aircraft 
on two opposite direction lanes often need to 
manoeuvre in order not to lose minimum separation. 
Hence, an effective safe spacing level for S should at 
least be larger than a safe separation minimum S'. 
Both for S and S', it is important to further learn 
understanding what criteria should apply. Obviously, 
in a full free flight situation, there are many other 
encounter types that have to be studied (crossing 
routes, cross flight level, join same flight level, 
longitudinal separation, etc.). The idea is to 
understand the relation between accident risk and 
lateral spacing for one encounter type first, before 
proceeding to study other encounter types. 
S
Airport
A S '
Airport
B
Figure 1: Top view of two opposite direction parallel 
lanes at the same flight level. S denotes lateral spacing, 
S' denotes lateral separation minimum. 
 
The objective of this paper is to estimate safe values 
for S and S', for a stream of aircraft that are all 
equipped according to the free flight operational 
concept outlined in Section 5. The safe spacing 
evaluation of opposite traffic streams within this 
operational concept is performed through an 
organised sequence of well-defined accident risk 
assessment stages:  
1. Identify the operation to be assessed.  
2. Identify all hazards. 
3. Instantiate a mathematical model for the 
operation to be assessed. 
4. Perform an accident risk assessment for this 
mathematical model of the operation. 
5. Assess risk bias and uncertainty due to 
differences between the mathematical model and 
the real operation considered.  
6. Compare the assessed accident risk levels with 
applicable risk criteria and evaluate the impact of 
separation criteria. 
7. Assess the safety and spacing critical elements of 
the operation considered. 
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For the application considered in this paper, 
stages 1, 2, 3 and 4 have been executed in [13]; 
stages 5, 6 and 7 have been executed in [14]. The 
main results of all stages are presented in this paper.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 4 
presents the results of stage 1 (operation). Section 5 
presents the results of stage 2 (hazards). Section 6 
presents the results of stage 3 (instantiate model). 
Section 7 presents the results of stage 4 (model-based 
risk assessment). Section 8 presents the results of 
stages 5 and 6 (bias and uncertainty assessment and 
impact of separation criteria). Section 9 presents the 
results of stage 7 (critical elements of operation). 
Section 10 draws conclusions. 
4. Operational concept considered 
The separation assurance equipment of the aircraft 
considered is based on an extension of an Initial Free 
Flight (IFF) operational concept developed by 
Hoekstra et al [15], which is one of the various free 
flight operational concepts developed [16]. Based on 
the IFF accident risk assessment results [17], 
operational concept extensions have been developed, 
leading to the Extended Free Flight (XFF) 
operational concept. The main characteristics of XFF 
are as follows:  
• Aircraft are equipped with ADS-B, and use this 
to inform other aircraft about both their 
position/speed and their intent (flight plan).  
• Aircraft have medium term conflict detection and 
resolution (CD&R) automation support that 
detects conflicts between flight plans and 
proposes a flight plan resolution. 
• Aircraft have Flight Plan Conformance 
Monitoring (FPCM) that detects severe 
deviations by both the own and the other aircraft 
from their respective flight plans and proposes a 
flight plan adjustment to increase separation.  
• Aircraft have short term CD&R automation 
support that detects conflicts and gives resolution 
advisories, which the pilots can confirm and then 
automatically fly.  
Some additional explanation is given in subsections 
4.1 through 4.9.  
4.1 Airspace organisation 
The airspace is not covered by radar and is without 
any ATC separation support. Aircraft are expected to 
fly direct routes between entry and exit points, 
conform the agreed plan with air traffic flow manage-
ment (ATFM). In this paper, the collision risk 
analysis is subsequently limited to one of these direct 
routes, with two opposite direction parallel lanes at 
the same flight level (Figure 1). Hence, it is assumed 
that nominally the aircraft flight plan is conform the 
ATFM agreed plan, i.e. conform the right lane. 
4.2 ADS-B 
ADS-B is used to inform other aircraft of aircraft 
state (position and speed vector) and intent (flight 
plan) information. In flight, each aircraft broadcasts 
at an update rate of one per second nominally: 
• the medium term flight plans (available in FMS), 
• the own state estimates (available from its 
navigation system).  
Hence, the following information is available on 
board of each aircraft: 
• The flight plan of the own aircraft. 
• The estimated state of the own aircraft. 
• The medium term flight plans of the surrounding 
aircraft (say, within 60 Nm radius). 
• The state estimate information from the 
surrounding aircraft. 
4.3 Medium term CD&R 
Conflict Probing (CP) checks whether the flight plans 
of the own aircraft and the surrounding aircraft 
(which are available through ADS-B) are in conflict 
(i.e., distance smaller than S', see Figure 1) in 
medium term, and proposes a flight plan resolution. 
This is done on board of each aircraft, by testing 
whether a conflict between flight plans occurs within 
medium term (i.e. the next 5 minutes). If a conflict 
between flight plans is detected, the pilots-not-flying 
of the aircraft involved are both alerted through their 
displays upon which they both have the responsibility 
to adjust their flight plans by confirming the proposed 
resolution to increase separation (minimally S 
between the flight plans). Normally, only one aircraft 
adjusts his flight plan in response to the alert. The 
reason for this is that it takes some time before proper 
action is taken: if one aircraft adjusts his flight plan 
such that there is no conflict, there is no reason for 
the other aircraft to adjust his flight plan.  
4.4 FPCM 
The FPCM monitors whether the aircraft evolutions 
of both the own and the surrounding aircraft conform 
to their flight plans. This is done on board of each 
aircraft, by comparison of the aircraft filtered state 
and the flight plan for each aircraft. If the deviations 
between the aircraft filtered state and the flight plan 
are severe, i.e. pass a given threshold (taken about 1.5 
Nm), then the pilots-not-flying are alerted through 
their display. Also, a flight plan resolution is 
automatically proposed. 
• If the FPCM alert concerns a severe deviation of 
some nearby aircraft from its flight plan, the 
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pilot-not-flying (i.e. the pilot who is not actively 
flying the aircraft, but who has other tasks such 
as communication) has the task to adjust the 
flight plan of his own aircraft by confirming the 
proposed resolution to increase separation 
(minimally 10 Nm between the flight plans) with 
the deviating aircraft. 
• If the FPCM alert concerns a severe deviation 
from the aircraft's own flight plan, the pilot-not-
flying has the responsibility to advice the 
surrounding aircraft through R/T to increase the 
minimal separation between flight plans to 
minimally 10 Nm and to ask the pilot-flying to 
return to flight plan. Furthermore, the pilot-not-
flying tries to solve the problem that caused the 
severe deviation. If necessary, the pilot-not-
flying of another aircraft will adjust his flight 
plan to ensure this separation.  
Adjustments in flight plan to ensure sufficient 
separation by deviating aircraft are assumed to 
consist of an immediate turn to the left or to the right, 
which heading is flown until the original heading can 
be resumed without compromising the desired 
separation between flight plans. If the point of closest 
approach is passed, each aircraft returns to its original 
flight plan. For the same reason as with medium term 
CD&R: normally, only 1 aircraft will adjust his flight 
plan. 
4.5 Short term CD&R 
The pilots of both conflicting aircraft are warned 
automatically if a separation conflict (i.e., distance 
smaller than S', see Figure 1) is expected to occur 
within 2 minutes on the basis of the neighbouring 
aircraft's estimated position and velocity vectors 
(which are available through ADS-B) and the 
predicted position and velocity (using linear 
prediction). After detection, a conflict resolution is 
proposed automatically for each aircraft using the 
Voltage Potential algorithm (see [15]) which 
proposes adjustments in the horizontal velocities 
(with no priority rules). After some human response 
time the pilot-flying confirms the proposed conflict 
resolution. Then the resolution is carried out 
automatically and is continuously updated (every 10 
seconds) effectively according the state estimate 
update without further pilot acknowledgements. 
Hence, normally, both aircraft will perform conflict 
resolution. 
4.6 Priority rules in reacting to alerts 
The following rules determine the priority of reacting 
to alerts:  
• Short term conflict detection and resolution is 
handled with priority over CP or FPCM alerts. 
The underlying reason is that in case of a short 
term conflict, immediate action is required, 
whereas CP and FPCM alerts require action at 
planning level. 
• If both CP and FPCM issue an alert, the FPCM 
alert is handled with priority. The underlying 
reason is that the aircraft that causes the FPCM 
alert cannot be expected to take effective action 
to ensure separation, since the pilots on board are 
probably preoccupied with repairing the problem 
that caused the alert. This is in contrast to the 
case of a CP alert, where it is reasonable to 
assume that the other aircraft will also taken 
action.  
• An FPCM alert concerning the own aircraft has 
priority over FPCM alerts concerning other 
aircraft. This is due to the observation that in 
case that the own aircraft cannot adhere to the 
flight plan very well, adjustments of the flight 
plan to avoid some other aircraft are not expected 
to be very effective. Therefore, priority lies with 
warning the other aircraft (in case they have not 
detected the deviation themselves yet) and 
solving the problem on board. 
4.7 XFF-specific human responsibilities 
The general responsibilities of the pilot-flying and the 
pilot-not-flying are to carry out the mission of the 
aircraft in a safe and efficient manner. The XFF-
specific responsibility of the pilot-flying is the correct 
execution of the flight plan. The responsibility of the 
pilot-not-flying is to respond to any CD&R 
automation messages by looking at the CD&R traffic 
screen and taking appropriate actions. It is assumed 
that the pilots do not take over each other's role. ATC 
is only involved when an aircraft leaves or enters the 
free flight airspace considered. 
4.8 Radio communication 
For emergency situations (e.g. to warn other aircraft 
in case of severe deviations from flight plan due to 
aircraft system problems), the pilots-not-flying have 
radio only to communicate with each other.  
4.9 Navigation 
Aircraft navigation performance is assumed to be 
RNP1 (Required Navigation Performance), which 
means that an aircraft stays within ± 1 Nm of its 
flight plan for 95% of the time. Ground navigation 
support is VOR/DME (Very high frequency Omni-
directional Range/ Distance Measuring Equipment; 
this is navigation based on ground beacons). 
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5. Hazard identification 
Once the operational concept has been sufficiently 
described (note that this does not mean that too much 
detail is required or called for, such as air temperature 
or specific route coordinates), the hazards are 
identified. This is done in two steps: (1) Identification 
of entities and their functional relationships; (2) 
Identification of hazards, both functional and non-
functional. 
5.1 Identification of entities 
In this step, the operational concept description is 
investigated to identify the entities of the operation. 
These entities may be humans (pilot-flying; pilot-not-
flying), technical systems (navigation support; ADS-
B; cockpit display; FPCM, etc.), or even more 
abstract entities (e.g. pilot training; weather; aircraft 
mission; aircraft evolution). For XFF, the complete 
list is provided in [13]. The main entities for XFF are 
also given in Figure 2, each represented by a box, and 
dependency relations are represented by arrows 
between the boxes. 
Navigation 
support
local modes
FPCM
other aircraft
Flightplan data
other aircraft
ADS-B aircraft
modes
Flightplan
modes
Aircraft
evolution
modes
Pilot not
flying modes
FPCM
ownaircraft
Aircraft
system modes
Display and
computer modes
Navigation 
support
groundmodes
Short term
conflict detection
and resolution
Pilot 
flying modes
Conflict probe 
modes
 
Figure 2: Functional dependency relations between the 
main entities for XFF.  
5.2 Identification of hazards 
This step involves the identification of as many 
hazards that may occur during the XFF operation as 
possible. Several systematic techniques exist that can 
be used for this task. Many of these techniques can be 
used to identify functional hazards, i.e. hazards that 
can be derived from the functional representation 
adopted in Figure 2. Examples of such functional 
hazards are: Navigation system failure; Pilot fails to 
make turn; Corrupted ADS-B data sent. More 
demanding to identify are the non-functional hazards, 
which are mostly human-related. These hazards are 
best identified using dedicated brainstorm sessions 
with a few participants bringing complementary 
expertise, for example one experienced pilot and one 
experienced air traffic controller. An additional 
important source of hazards is hazard databases.  
For XFF, about 230 hazards have been 
identified; the list is provided in [14]. Of these, about 
46% is of technical system nature. About 36% is 
human related, about 13% is procedure-related, and 
the remaining hazards are of other nature (e.g. 
weather). A list of some non-functional hazards is 
given in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Some non-functional hazards identified for 
XFF.  
Id Hazards 
M3 Two aircraft do not detect conflict at the same 
time 
M5 Pilot solves a conflict that occurs later than the 
cockpit display look-ahead time 
M6 Pilot does not know whether other aircraft has 
conflict displayed 
M18 Old intent data is transmitted because pilot has no 
time to update FMS during emergency 
M34 Aircrew unaware of loss of communication (think 
it’s just quiet) 
0473 Pilot does not acknowledge conflict resolution 
0608 False conflict alert 
0674 Flightplan is incorrectly revised by pilot 
6. Develop risk assessment model 
The next step is to develop a mathematical model of 
the XFF operation, restricted to the situation of the 
two opposite direction parallel lanes, which covers as 
many hazards as possible. For this model, the 
Dynamically Coloured Petri Net (DCPN) formalism 
[18], [19] is used, which is a particular Petri net 
extension.  
6.1 Petri net formalism 
An (Ordinary) Petri net is a graph of places 
(representing possible conditions or modes), 
transitions (which model switches between these 
modes), and arrows (which connect the places with 
the transitions). Tokens residing in the places denote 
which modes are current. If all places by which a 
transition is connected through an incoming arrow 
(these places are its input places) are current, then the 
transition is enabled, and fires, i.e. it removes the 
tokens from its input places, and produces tokens for 
its output places, thus modelling a mode switch. An 
uncomplicated example would be: 
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Place 1
Place 2
Transition 2
Transit ion 1
 
Figure 3: Petri net example. A token resides in Place 1, 
denoting that that place is the current mode or 
condition. Transition 2 has a token in its input place, 
hence is enabled and may fire. 
 
A Dynamically Coloured Petri Net is an extension of 
Ordinary Petri net in which stochastic differential 
equations are coupled to places. A token in a place 
has a colour, assuming a multi-dimensional value, 
which is the solution of the place-specific stochastic 
differential equation. A transition which has tokens in 
each of its input places takes their evolving colours 
into account: the transition may fire after a particular 
stochastic colour-dependent delay, or it may fire 
when the colours of its input tokens have reached a 
particular value. After firing, the transition produces 
coloured tokens in its output places. 
6.2 Petri net specification 
To specify a DCPN for a particular operation, first, 
local Petri nets (LPNs) are instantiated for each entity 
(i.e. for each box in Figure 2). Next, the LPNs are 
connected to each other with additional arrows, 
places and/or transitions, modelling the interactions 
and dependencies between the entities. The whole 
DCPN model building process usually takes several 
iterations, in which both the LPNs and the 
interactions are updated. After the final iteration, the 
DCPN forms a mathematical model of the evolution 
of the states (e.g. position and velocity) of flows of 
aircraft as a function of time, influenced by the 
behaviour (both nominal and non-nominal: hazards) 
of all entities existing in the operation.  
For the XFF example considered in this paper 
the DCPN instantiation is specified in [13]; it is 
composed of 14 LPNs, and has in total 39 places (if 
one counts for only one aircraft) coupled by 
transitions and arrows.  
6.3 Example Petri net 
Figure 4 presents an example of (the graphical part 
of) two LPNs for XFF and their interconnections. In 
this figure, on the left hand side there is the LPN for 
Pilot-flying, on the right hand side there is the LPN 
for Short term conflict detection and resolution 
(STCD&R); for an explanation see below the figure. 
   
Not delayed
Delayed
T1
Resolution
No conflictConf lictInactive
 detected
LPN for Pilot-flying LPN for STCD&R
T2
 
Figure 4: Local Petri nets for entities Pilot-Flying and 
Short term conflict detection and resolution, and one of 
their interactions. In this figure, the pilot-flying is in 
mode Not delayed, and the STCD&R is in Conflict 
detected. Transition T2 is enabled and can fire, 
removing the token from Conflict detected (but not from 
Not delayed since the arrow from that place is an 
enabling arc), and producing a token in place 
Resolution.  
 
The Pilot-flying LPN has three places, which means 
that three modes are identified for the pilot-flying. 
There is one Inactive mode, which models the 
situation that this pilot does not act when he should. 
There are two active modes. In one active mode the 
pilot has time, is Not delayed, and takes proper 
actions in time. In the other active mode the pilot is 
Delayed and is too preoccupied to act immediately. 
The Delayed mode therefore involves an additional 
delay in implementing separation conflict recovering 
actions. The LPN switches between these three 
modes at random times, with particular switching 
rates. The colour of the token in this LPN equals the 
reaction time of the pilot-flying, which is stochastic 
and dependent on the current mode (e.g. in Delayed, 
this reaction time is larger than in Not delayed). Pilot 
level of skill and training is assumed incorporated in 
the pilot performance distribution. 
The STCD&R LPN also has three places; it 
models conflict resolution through three modes: In 
the No conflict mode, no separation conflicts are 
expected in short or medium term. In the Conflict 
detected mode, a conflict has been detected and the 
automation support proposes a resolution while the 
resolution has not been acknowledged yet. In the 
Resolution mode the resolution from the automation 
support has been acknowledged by the pilot-flying 
and is then implemented automatically. The 
resolution is continuously up-dated according to the 
most recent intent information of the intruding 
aircraft without further pilot acknowledgements. The 
colour of the token in this LPN contains information 
necessary for  the short term conflict detection and 
resolution algorithm. In places No conflict and 
Conflict detected it contains information like time of 
closest approach of an intruding aircraft, the identity 
of the first intruding aircraft, etc. If a separation 
conflict is expected to occur within the look-ahead 
Preprint: Simulation, Transactions of the Society for Modeling and Simulation International, Vol. 82 (2006) 
7 
time and the pilot has acknowledged it, place 
Resolution gets a token, with a value equal to a 
conflict resolution for the aircraft (i.e. a new heading 
and velocity, until the point where the aircraft can fly 
in a straight line to the exit point of the sector without 
causing a conflict). If the conflict has been resolved, 
place No conflict becomes the current one again. 
In Figure 4, between these two LPNs two 
interacting arrows are drawn: One arrow from place 
Delayed to transition T1, and one arrow from place 
Not delayed to transition T2. Both arrows have a 
small dot at the tip instead of a normal arrow head, 
denoting that they are enabling arcs, i.e. the transition 
at the tip of the arrow can only fire if there is a token 
in the place at the beginning of the arrow, but it will 
not consume this token when it fires. This interaction 
models that STCD&R can only switch from Conflict 
detection to mode Resolution if the Pilot-flying is 
active, i.e. either Delayed or Not delayed. As long as 
the Pilot-flying is in mode Inactive, a short term 
conflict, even if detected by the automatic detection 
system, is not acknowledged by the pilot, and will 
therefore not be resolved.   
Note that in [13], the descriptions for the LPNs 
of Figure 4 also include rates or rules for the 
transitions on when and what to fire, and precise 
descriptions on how the token colours change 
through time. Moreover, for simplicity of the figure, 
there are many more interactions with other local 
Petri nets that are not drawn.   
7. Assess collision risk for model 
7.1 Accident risk assessment method 
The accident risk assessment makes use of an 
expression for collision risk [20] which includes as 
baseline the ICAO-adopted model of Reich [21] for 
risk of collisions between aircraft. The expression 
writes collision risk ],0[ Tℜ  within some time interval 
[0,T], as a function of the incrossing rate )(tijϕ  of 
the relative position of two aircraft i and j into some 
collision area: 
∑∑∫
= >
=ℜ
n
i
n
ij
T
ij
T dtt
1 0
],0[ )(ϕ  
This incrossing rate might be evaluated using Monte 
Carlo simulations of the DCPN instantiation. 
However, since collisions occur very infrequently, 
they are not counted very often, and direct Monte 
Carlo simulations may not produce significant 
results. For this reason, collision risk is decomposed 
into sums of risk contributions of specifically defined 
events in time, as in the following equation [22]: 
∑∑∑ ∫
= >
=⋅==ℜ
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n
ij
T
ij
T
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where )|( κκϕ
τ
=ijt
ij
 is the incrossing rate, 
conditional on event ijτκ  of type κ  at moment 
ijτ , 
and }Pr{ κκ
τ
=ij  is the probability that event type κ  
occurs prior to any of the other defined events. If the 
events are chosen well, each of the individual factors 
in this expression can be evaluated through dedicated 
Monte Carlo simulations on the DCPN model.  
7.2 Accident risk assessment for XFF 
For XFF, for each pair (i,j) of aircraft that meet each 
other on the opposite direction lanes, 64 event types 
were identified (i.e. the sum over κ  in the equation 
above has 64 terms); each is composed as follows: 
For aircraft i there exists a triple (Navigation loopi, 
Tactical loopi, Strategic loopi) and for aircraft j there 
exists a triple (Navigation loopj, Tactical loopj, 
Strategic loopj). Each of the terms in both triples can 
have values in {Nominal, Non-nominal}. The com-
bination of the two triples yields 23 × 23 = 64 values.  
Some explanations of Tactical loop, Nominal, 
etc, are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Some terms briefly explained 
Term Explanation 
Nominal Behaviour corresponding with the planned 
ordinary. 
Non-
nominal 
Behaviour corresponding with a deviation 
from the planned ordinary, e.g. a system 
failure, a mistake, confusion, a delay. 
Navigation 
loop  
Set of LPNs that determine to which extent 
the aircraft adheres to the ATFM agreed 
plan. Non-nominal Navigation loop 
conditions (possibly causing severe 
deviations from lane) occur e.g. if the pilot 
accidentally disconnects autopilot, or if the 
flightplan contains an error, or if the 
navigation system is not properly working 
Tactical 
loop 
Set of LPNs that determine whether the 
aircraft is able to perform a timely short 
term evasive manouevre in case of an 
expected separation conflict. Non-nominal 
Tactical loop conditions are caused by e.g. 
pilot being distracted or ADS-B systems not 
working, any time between time when 
aircraft meets another on the opposite 
direction lane and 2 minutes before that. 
Strategic 
loop 
Set of LPNs that determine whether the 
pilots are able to adjust their flightplan to 
prevent a medium term conflict. Non-
nominal Strategic loop conditions are 
caused by e.g. pilot under-estimates danger 
of conflict, or ADS-B systems not working, 
any time between 5 and 2 min before time 
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when aircraft meets another on the opposite 
direction lane  
7.3 Accident risk results 
By making use of dedicated Monte Carlo simulations 
on the DCPN instantiation for the XFF example, the 
factors )|( κκϕ
τ
=ijt
ij
 and }Pr{ κκ
τ
=ij  in the 
equation for ],0[ Tℜ  above are assessed for all event 
types κ , and are combined to obtain accident risk as 
a function of the spacing parameter S. This is the 
connected curve in Figure 5, which is from [13]. The 
horizontal axis shows the spacing S, the vertical axis 
shows the number of aircraft accidents per aircraft 
flight hour that can be expected for this spacing. 
Figure 5: Risk-spacing curve for XFF-DCPN model 
(), which is a sum of three curves; '...' denotes 
contribution to risk from encountering aircraft that are 
both in Nominal Navigation loop mode; '-⋅-⋅' denotes 
contribution to risk from encountering aircraft of which 
one is in Nominal Navigation loop mode and one is in 
Non-nominal Navigation loop mode; '---' denotes 
contribution to risk from encountering aircraft that are 
both in Non-nominal Navigation loop mode. The 
horizontal line is a currently applicable Target Level of 
Safety (TLS) (ICAO) [23]. 
 
The risk-spacing curve for the XFF-DCPN model 
intersects the TLS at S = 7 Nm, which would indicate 
that based on the DCPN model instantiated for XFF 
operations restricted to a fixed route structure, a 
distance of S = 7 Nm between the parallel lanes is 
safe.  
In Figure 5, the risk-spacing curve is 
decomposed into a sum of three curves (each curve is 
based on clusters of event types κ ): 
• '...' denotes contribution to risk from 
encountering aircraft that are both in nominal 
Navigation loop mode (see Table 2);  
• '-⋅-⋅' denotes contribution to risk from 
encountering aircraft of which one is in nominal 
Navigation loop mode and one is in non-nominal 
Navigation loop mode;  
• '---' denotes contribution to risk from 
encountering aircraft that are both in non-
nominal Navigation loop mode 
It appears that for S smaller than 7 Nm, the 
contribution from encountering aircraft that are both 
in nominal Navigation loop mode (curve '...') is 
dominant. For S greater than 7 Nm, the contribution 
from encountering aircraft of which one is in nominal 
Navigation loop mode and the other is in non-
nominal Navigation loop mode (curve '-⋅-⋅') is 
dominant. These two contributing factors lead to two 
curves with different slope. Their sum creates a curve 
which has a bend.  
Further analysis yields that if S' (separation 
minimum) and S (spacing) are jointly optimised, the 
following results are obtained: safe S' = 5 Nm, safe S 
= 7 Nm. Moreover, sensitivity analysis shows that for 
the XFF-DCPN model, accident risk is more sensitive 
to spacing S than to separation minimum S'. 
8. Bias and uncertainty assessment 
So far, we took a formal modelling approach towards 
the accident risk assessment. This means that 
accident risk is assessed for the instantiated model of 
the XFF example. One thing is sure, for operations as 
complex as the XFF example considered, a model 
will always differ from reality, and thus model 
validation cannot be a matter of showing that the 
model equals reality. The validation problem rather is 
how to verify that the model ‘matches’ reality 
sufficiently well, with respect to the intended use of 
the model. An absolute ‘match’ is neither feasible nor 
necessary. Thus, validation addresses the questions:  
• how much differs the instantiated model from 
reality, and 
• how large is the effect of these deviations on the 
outcomes of the assessment?   
Hence, it is necessary to bring the model assumptions 
made to the foreground and subsequently perform an 
analysis of their effects on accident risk. 
8.1 Model assumptions 
Four types of model assumptions are identified in [12] 
that influence these effects: 
• Numerical approximation assumptions; 
• Parameter values; 
• Model structure assumptions; 
• Assumptions due to Non-coverage of hazards. 
The effect of each model assumption on accident risk 
can be of two kinds: 
• Bias; due to the adoption of the formal model 
assumption, the DCPN model-based accident 
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risk is systematically higher or lower than 
expected for the real operation.  
• Uncertainty; there exists uncertainty in the 
DCPN model-based accident risk, for example 
due to uncertainty in the value of some 
parameter. 
8.2 Evaluation of model assumptions 
In [14], the bias and uncertainty of each individual 
assumption has been assessed For the XFF-DCPN 
model, this covered 122 assumptions: 
• 7 assumptions due to numerical approximation 
have been identified and assessed by an expert of 
both the DCPN model and its numerical 
implementation. See Table 3 for two examples. 
 
Table 3: Example numerical approximation 
assumptions 
Id Assumption Assessment 
nm03 The probability density 
function of the lateral 
position of the aircraft is 
approximated by a sum of 
Gaussians 
Neutral effect 
nm04 If the planning loop is non-
nominal  some time during 
the planning loop interval, 
it is considered non-
nominal  for the complete 
interval 
Negligible 
pessimistic 
bias 
 
• 70 assumptions due to selection of DCPN model 
parameter values have been identified by 
scanning the DCPN model description as 
documented in [13], and have been verified by 
an expert of the numerical implementation of the 
DCPN model. The bias and uncertainty of these 
values have been assessed by using statistical 
data, and by using input from operational 
experts. The risk sensitivity of these values has 
been assessed through expert knowledge of the 
DCPN model and software, and through (partial) 
accident risk evaluations of the DCPN model. 
See Table 4 for some examples. 
 
Table 4: Example parameter value assumptions 
Sym-
bol 
Parameter 
explanation 
Value Assess-
ment 
Gv  
Average ground 
speed  
250 
m/s 
Small 
uncertainty 
max
⊥v  
Maximal rate of 
climb/ descent 
10 m/s Negligible 
uncertainty 
PF
6µ  Mean duration for Pilot-Flying to 
perform task when 
in Not delayed  
mode,  
5 s Minor 
uncertainty 
Nflow The number of 
aircraft that enters 
each lane per hour   
3.6 Minor 
uncertainty 
 
• 23 assumptions due to model structure of the 
DCPN model have been identified and assessed 
by stochastic experts of the DCPN model. See 
Table 5 for some examples. 
 
Table 5: Example model structure assumptions 
Id Assumption Assessment 
md01 Aircraft flight plan switches 
between Nominal and Non-
nominal independent of 
other local Petri nets 
Minor 
optimistic bias 
md06 Stochastic effects due to 
weather are implicitly 
incorporated in aircraft 
evolution model 
Negligible 
optimistic bias 
md22 Conflicts are solved 
sequentially and first in first 
out. 
Negligible 
pessimistic 
bias 
 
• 22 assumptions due to non-coverage of hazards 
have been identified and assessed as follows: 
Each of the hazards identified for XFF has been 
analysed by experts of the DCPN model on 
coverage by the DCPN model. If a hazard 
appeared not to be covered, an assumption was 
formulated to explain this. The resulting list of 
assumptions has been assessed by operational 
experts. See Table 6 for some examples. 
 
Table 6: Example non-coverage of hazards 
assumptions 
Id Assumption Assessment 
hc06 Pilot does not disconnect 
the autopilot deliberately 
Negligible 
optimistic bias 
hc16 No conflicts with non-
existing aircraft are 
detected 
Zero effect 
hc18 For all aircraft, ADS-B 
works according to specs 
Significant 
optimistic bias 
 
Since the assessments of these assumptions often are 
subjective, the outcome depends on the availability of 
capable experts of the model, the accident risk 
assessment and the operational concepts considered, 
on the exhaustiveness of the hazard identification, 
and on the availability of reliable statistical data.  
8.3 Combining bias and uncertainty results 
Next, all results are combined, following [12], to 
obtain a model bias compensation factor and 95% 
credibility interval for risk of the actual operation. 
The bias and uncertainty assessment results 
obtained for realistic XFF operations are given in 
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Figure 6. These results are based on the XFF-DCPN 
model results, corrected for the effects of all model 
assumptions adopted. For comparison, the figure 
shows the XFF-DCPN model-based risk-spacing 
curve together with is decomposition as a sum of 
three curves (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 6: The connected curve is the XFF-DCPN-based 
risk-spacing curve, decomposed as a sum of three 
contributions as in Figure 5. The * denotes accident risk 
for realistic XFF operations, which are obtained by 
correcting DCPN model-based accident risk for the 
effects of the four types of model assumptions. The 95% 
credibility interval for XFF is given by o and +. 
Notice that the assessments of the assumptions apply 
to changes of the risk-spacing curve for the XFF-
DCPN model at one value for S: at the point where 
the curve intersects the target level of safety. Also 
note that some of these assumptions will have an 
effect on the nominal × nominal curve, others will 
have an effect on the nominal × non-nominal curve, 
etc., or even on more than one curve. From this, it is 
easily seen that the assessments of these assumptions 
do not necessarily hold for all values of S. However, 
if we assume that they do hold for values of S nearby 
this intersection point, then the expected risk-spacing 
curve for realistic XFF operations intersects the TLS 
at S = 9.0 Nm. The assessed 95% credibility interval 
for realistic XFF accident risk would then intersect 
the TLS at S = 5.4 Nm and at S = 14.4 Nm.  
9. Feedback to airborne separation 
assurance concept development 
The method and results described in Sections 5 
through 8 can be used to obtain feedback, both on the 
on the operation assessed and on the model 
developed. The first mainly comes from the accident 
risk versus spacing curves, the latter mainly comes 
from the bias and uncertainty assessment: 
9.1 Feedback on the operation 
Based on the risk assessment results obtained, it is 
possible to identify for some operational aspects how 
they influence safe S values for XFF operations 
restricted to a fixed route structure:  
• A lower flow of traffic between airports A and B 
in the model is expected to lead to a marginal 
improvement of the safe S value only. The 
reason is that although accident risk will go 
down, the quite steep slope of the nominal curve 
in Figure 6 will prevent the safe S value from 
going down significantly. 
• A higher flow of traffic between airports A and 
B in the model is expected to lead to a significant 
increase of the safe S value. The reason is that 
accident risk will go up, and the quite shallow 
slope of the non-nominal curve in Figure  6 will 
lead to significant increase of the safe S value. 
• Without the broadcast of intent information by 
all aircraft it is expected that the safe S value 
increases significantly. The reason is that if pilots 
are not able to make medium term flight plans 
that are conflict free then all conflicts have to be 
resolved on short term; this was studied in [17]. 
• Leaving out FPCM automation is expected to 
lead to a significant increase of the safe S value. 
The reason is that in such case the nominal × 
non-nominal curve is expected to shift to 
significantly higher risk values. 
• Tightening required navigation performance, 
e.g., from RNP1 to RNP0.3, is expected to lead 
to a marginal decrease of safe S value only. The 
reason is that the non-nominal contribution 
curves will hardly change. In Figure 6 this  
prevents the safe S value from going down 
significantly. 
• Relaxing required navigation performance, e.g., 
from RNP1 to RNP5, is expected to lead to a 
significant increase of the safe S value. The 
reason is that the steep part of the curve in Figure 
6 will get a much shallower slope. 
• Sensitivity analysis shows that the accident risk 
is significantly less sensitive to changes in the 
value of the separation minimum S’ than to 
changes in the spacing value S. 
 
At all times, one should be aware that the above 
findings have been obtained within the context of the 
hypothetical XFF operational concept considered. 
Nevertheless the findings obtained give a lot of 
valuable and original insight both into key issues of 
airborne separation assurance design and in safe 
spacing and separation criteria assessment for 
advanced ATM.   
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9.2 Feedback on the risk assessment 
The bias and uncertainty assessment in [14] showed 
that the main factors contributing to bias and 
uncertainty in the model assessed risk values are: 
• Response times of the pilots to CD&R and 
FPCM messages when they are busy with other 
tasks. 
• Aircraft that do not have a properly working 
ADS-B on board. 
• Short term CD&R also proposing vertical escape 
manoeuvres.    
These factors are potential candidates to be further 
studied on safety and when better understood they 
may be used to improve the XFF-DCPN model, and 
subsequently be incorporated in the risk assessment 
in order to reduce bias and uncertainty.  
10. Concluding remarks 
10.1 Accident risk results  
In this paper, a hypothetical airborne separation 
assurance operational concept has been evaluated on 
safe spacing and separation criteria. This is done by 
assessment of both the model based risk and the bias 
and uncertainty that is caused by differences between 
the model and reality. In particular, due to the 
decomposition of the total risk curve into different 
contributing terms, the results deliver valuable 
feedback to airborne separation assurance design. In 
fact, some of these feedback results have already 
been obtained in [13]. However, it is due to the added 
bias and uncertainty assessment of [14] that we 
reached a level of confidence necessary for 
publishing the results. We also believe there is room 
for valuable extensions in the bias and uncertainty 
assessment performed: a bias and uncertainty 
assessment should be done for all values of S, and for 
each of the three risk contributing terms separately.    
10.2 Beyond operation considered  
It should be clear that the results of this study are not 
intended to provide a definitive answer to questions 
like “Is Airborne Separation Assurance safer and 
more capacitive than conventional ATM?”. In order 
to answer such questions, many important aspects 
remain to be studied, such as: 
• Pilot-not-flying monitoring the traffic; is this 
manageable for the pilot?  
• Aircraft flying outside the known route 
structures; what is the impact? 
• The Airborne Separation Assurance operational 
concept considered in this study may differ from 
other Airborne Separation Assurance operational 
concepts under development. 
• Many encounter scenarios have not been 
assessed. 
• The XFF scenario considered puts high 
requirements on conflict trajectory planning and 
negotiation even between aircraft that are more 
than 5 minutes apart. These requirements are 
sufficient but may not be necessary. 
• Contributions from Ground ATM are not 
considered in this study. 
Reasonably, these aspects have to be understood 
before one can draw final conclusions on safety and 
capacity comparison between conventional ATM and 
free flight. This asks for additional risk assessments 
and these are the subject of follow-up study.  
10.3 Further developments 
The TOPAZ risk assessment methodology has been 
applied to many other operations and encounter 
scenarios, including several operations that were 
developed for short-term introduction. These 
applications showed that the method works during 
both early and late life cycle phases of rather complex 
operations and can provide valuable feedback and 
insight into the safety/capacity aspects of the 
operation analysed.  
For most stages of the TOPAZ risk assessment 
methodology, further developments are ongoing in 
collaboration with other researchers [24], e.g. on the 
following topics: 
• During the instantiation of a mathematical model 
the graphs of the Local Petri nets and their 
interactions may become very cluttered and 
unreadable for complex applications with many 
interacting entities.  
• The decomposition of accident risk assessment 
into conditional Monte Carlo simulations 
currently is application-specific. Significant 
improvements on this are under development by 
exploring sequential Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques. 
• Regarding bias and uncertainty assessment, 
further research and developments focus on 
improving how to handle model structure 
assumptions, operation concept assumptions and 
non-coverage of hazards assumptions.  
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